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RECENT DECISIONS
Taxation: The Property Tax Exemption and Non-Profit Homes
for the Aged: In Milwaukee Protestant Home for the Aged v. City
of Milwaukeel the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a four to three deci-
sion, granted tax-exempt status to a non-profit home for the aged in
which the occupants pay fees in excess of the cost of the services
they receive.
The Milwaukee Protestant Home for the Aged was founded in 1884
as a non-profit corporation solely for charitable purposes. The Home,
always operated at a deficit, provided care for the aged regardless of
their ability to pay and consequently had always been exempt from the
payment of property taxes. In 1963, Bradford Terrace, the most
recent addition to the Home, was opened for occupancy, but with a
different financing arrangement from the rest of the Home. All the
residents of Bradford Terrace are required to pay a founders fee
from $8,000 to $15,500, depending on the size of the living unit
desired, plus a monthly occupancy charge of from $150 to $160. In
addition, all its residents pay for any special services they require.
These charges exceed the operating costs of the addition and the
excess is used to pay back the endowment fund, from which the con-
struction costs of the addition had been borrowed. Taking note of
the financing arrangement used for the new addition, the City of Mil-
waukee placed Bradford Terrace on the tax rolls under the "taxed in
part" statute.2 The Home paid the property tax under protest and sued
for recovery. The trial court held in favor of the City and refused to
grant a tax exemption, on the grounds that the addition is being
operated for pecuniary profit.
The Background
The actual amount in controversy was only slightly over $39,000
per year at the then existing rates, but the case is significant because
it focuses on the financial difficulties of the city. With the costs and
disbursements of local governments steadily rising, property taxation
has become a major source of needed revenues. However, local gov-
ernments are faced with the discouraging trend of a proportionally
diminishing tax base. Nationally, the proportion of tax exempt prop-
erty has gone from 4.6% of $43,642,000,000 exempted in 1880, to
141 Wis. 2d 284, 164 N.W.2d 289 (1969).
2 WIs. StAT. § 70.11(8) (1967) provides:
Where property for which exemption is sought pursuant to this section
is used in part for exempt purposes and in part for pecuniary profit, then
the same shall be assessed for taxation at such percentage of the full
market value of said real and personal property as shall fairly measure
and represent the extent of such use for pecuniary profit ....
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23.4% of $1,263,740,000,000 in 1961, and to 32.6% of $1,748,630,000,-
000, or $569,479,000,000, exempted in 1968. 3
In Milwaukee, it is estimated that 25% of the property in the city
is tax exempt for one reason or another.4 In the twelve months ending
May 1, 1969, approximately $22,500,000 worth of property was removed
from the city tax rolls, more than $16,000,000 of it through acquisition
by tax-exempt organizations. 5 $1,210,694,250 worth of property in
the City of Milwaukee was exempt from general taxation in the
fiscal year ending April 30, 1969. Of that, $183,899,000 is attributed
to benevolent organizations such as hospitals and homes for the aged.
6
All states grant tax-exempt status to some property. Some states do
so without limitation, while others restrict exemptions to so-called
essentials. The narrow or strict position generally grants exemptions
only as an encouragement to those institutions which save the state
money by private performance of some of the state's duties (e.g., a
providing of food and shelter for the destitute). A more liberal phil-
osophy grants tax exemptions to all institutions devoted to generally
humanitarian goals (e.g., Boy Scouts' camps and art galleries) .7 In
Wisconsin, benevolent associations traditionally have been granted tax-
exempt status for their real and personal property," and a 1967 legis-
lative amendment specifically included "benevolent nursing homes and
retirement homes for the aged." 9
The Majority Opinion
In Milwaukee Protestant Home for the Aged, the majority of the
supreme court interprets the 1967 amendment as a clear legislative
policy decision that retirement homes for the aged are benevolent.1
The only question then remaining is whether the financing arrange-
ments of the new addition meet the requirements for a non-profit opera-
tion. 1 To decide that issue, the court makes a logical extension of
its previous decisions.
'3Meyers, Tax Exempt Property: Another Crushing Burden for the Cities,
FORTUNE, May 1, 1969, at 76-79.
4 Id. at 77.
5 Milwaukee Journal, Sept. 14, 1969, § 2, at 2, col. 6. These tentative figures
were presented by Robert E. Wood, State Supervisor of Assessments, to the
Milwaukee County Board's Finance Committee on September 13, 1969.6 Milwaukee Sentinel, Jan. 8, 1970, § 3 (Almanac), at 18, col. 6.
7See Note, Property Taxation of Non-Profit Rental Housing for the Aged, 39
TEMPLE L. REv. 88 (1965); see also Note, Exemption of Educational, Philan-
thropic and Religious Institutions from State Real Property Taxes, 64 H~AvARa
L. REv. 288 (1950), in which the author designates Wisconsin as a "humani-
tarian" theory jurisdiction.
8 WIS. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1967) provides exemption for: "Property owned and
used exclusively by . . . religious, educational or benevolent associations ...
while such property is not used for a profit."
9 Wis. LAWS 1967, ch. 64, adding to Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1967).10 41 Wis. 2d at 293, 164 N.W.2d at 293.
11 Id.
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Prairie du Chien Sanitarium Co. v. Prairie du Chien12 established
three criteria for tax exempt status: "[I]t must appear that, (1)
appellant is a benevolent association; (2) the personal property is
used exclusively for the purposes of such association; (3) the real
and personal property is not used for pecuniary profit."13 The court
said the first criterion is not at issue, and the second is easily dismissed
by the impossibility of any profit accruing to any individual. 1 4 There-
fore, the only issue to be resolved is whether the property is used for
pecuniary profit. Duncan v. Steeper" held that excess of income over
expenditures is not a bar to tax-exempt status and Sisters of St. Jo-
seph v. Town of Plover 6 pointed out that the excess must be used to
extend the benevolence. But, the majority said, the City is trying to
add a fourth requirement for tax-exempt status: that some residents
be admitted without charge.17 In rejecting this criterion, the majority
again cites the Duncan case to show that in Wisconsin "benevolent"
and "charitable" are broadly defined: "To help retired persons of
moderate means live out their remaining years is 'benevolent' whether
or not it is also considered, as we would consider it to be 'charitable.' "s
The court adds, finally, that the legislature simply did not provide
that some free services be a requirement. 9 Its discussion seems to
confirm the observation that Wisconsin generally has been a so-called
"humanitarian" theory jurisdiction, going beyond the "private per-
formance of the state's duties" theory.20 The majority opinion closes
by refusing to view the addition's financial arrangements as a separate
entity, saying that they can only be evaluated by examining the Home's
total operation.
2 1
The Dissenting Opinion
justices Beilfuss, Wilkie, and Heffernan dissented, stating first,
that tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against exemp-
tion.2 2 They then proceed to the benevolence issue, arguing that the
residents of the new addition are the recipients of their own benevo-
lence.23 In effect, the minority takes the position that there is no
12242 Wis. 262, 7 N.W.2d 832 (1943).
13 Id. at 264, 7 N.W.2d at 833.
1441 Wis. 2d at 294-95, 164 N.W.2d at 293-94.
15 17 Wis. 2d 226, 116 N.W.2d 154 (1962).
16239 Wis. 278, 1 N.W.2d 173 (1941).
1741 Wis. 2d at 298-99, 164 N.W.2d at 296.
18 Id. at 300, 164 N.W.2d at 297. In this area of tax exempt status of specified
organizations, the adjective "benevolent" is considered to have a broader defi-
nition than the word "charitable," and the distinction was specifically noted by
Justice Robert Hansen, writing for the majority, 41 Wis. 2d at 299, 164
N.W.2d at 296. But later in the opinion, the two words seem to be used with-
out attention to the distinction.
19 Id. at 300, 164 N.W.2d at 297.
20 Note, Exemption of Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Institutions
from State Real Property Taxes, 64 HARVARD L. REV. 288 (1950).
2141 Wis. 2d at 301-02, 164 N.W.2d at 297-98.
22 Id. at 303, 164 N.W.2d at 298.
23 Id. at 304-05, 164 N.W.2d at 299.
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charitable or benevolent element present when all residents pay the
entire cost or more of all the services they receive. Thus, the element
of benevolence is necessary for the tax exemption even though the
organization is a non-profit one. In its absence, the minority con-
cludes, the exemption should not be granted.
Comment
The majority of the court seems to assume that the legislature,
in its 1967 amendment, had already decided that all homes for the
aged are benevolent. But that assumption does not seem to be war-
ranted by the language of the statute. The amendment specified:
"benevolent nursing homes and retirement homes for the aged." 24
The logical assumption is that the word "benevolent" was meant to
be a qualifying adjective for both "nursing homes" and "retirement
homes for the aged." If so, not all non-profit nursing homes and
retirement homes for the aged are to be included, but only those which
are benevolent. For example, Wisconsin Statutes Sec. 70.11 (4) (1967)
exempts the property of women's clubs. There is no limitation for
benevolent women's clubs and presumably the legislature meant to
exempt from taxation property owned by all women's clubs. But,
by using the word "benevolent" before "nursing homes," the legislature
also presumably meant to exempt from taxation property owned only
by benevolent retirement homes. But, also, the majority's decision
fails to give any limiting effect to "benevolent," and the reasons for
that failure are not readily apparent. Section 70.11(4) explicitly states,
however, "while such property is not used for profit," and, therefore,
the distinction between benevolent and non-benevolent homes for the
aged must be something other than mere non-profit status. This dis-
tinction is not clearly made in the court's statement that:
In Wisconsin, the question of public policy involved has been
settled by the legislature. Wisconsin long has exempted from
taxation property of a benevolent association, used exclusively
for benevolent purposes and not for profit. In 1967, the Wis-
consin legislature amended this statute to specifically add "bene-
volent nursing homes and retirement homes for the aged" as
included in the tax exemption statute. This 1967 amendment
did not change the existing law as to retirement homes for the
aged. It merely clarified the legislative intent, and the reasons
for such legislative clarification were set forth.
So the question before us is not whether operating a retire-
ment home for the aged is a proper function of a benevolent
institution. The legislature has answered that. The sole question
here is whether the Milwaukee Protestant Home for the Aged
meets the standards as to non-profit operation set forth in the
tax exemption statute.2 5
24 Wis. LAWS 1967, ch. 64 (emphasis added).
25 41 Wis. 2d at 292-93, 164 N.W.2d at 293 (footnotes omitted).
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But the case seems to hold, however, that every non-profit home for
the aged is benevolent and entitled to the property tax exemption.
Without alluding to the two theories-the "doing the state's duty"
theory and the "humanitarian" theory-the court opted for the latter.
Under the "doing the state's duty" theory, the exemption would not
be granted because all the inhabitants of Bradford Terrace could and
did pay for their own care. Under the "humanitarian" theory, any
decision is purely a policy one: are non-profit homes for the aged
to be encouraged through a favorable tax status? The majority ans-
wers in the affimative, and Wisconsin continues to be a liberal "hu-
manitarian" theory jurisdiction.
In its simplest terms, any distinction between the two theories
really becomes one of adapting a broad or narrow definition of benevo-
lence or charity. The narrow definition equates charity with some
variation of almsgiving or aid to the poor and destitute-those not
able to take care of their own needs. This is consistent with the "doing
the state's duty" theory. A broad definition, on the other hand, en-
compasses care for the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of
the aged, even if, as here, they are able, and do in fact, pay for it.
This is the "humanitarian" theory.
The appellate courts of other jurisdictions, in considering whethe-
to grant tax exemptions for homes for the aged, while admittedly inter-
preting differently worded statutes and constitutions, are split evenly.
Florida, 6 California, 27 Kansas, 28 Montana, 29 Pennsylvania,30 Dela-
ware," 1 and now Wisconsin have all granted the exemption. Texas,32
26 Florida initially had denied the exemption in Haines v. St. Petersburg Metho-
dist Home, 173 So. 2d 176 (Fla. App. 1965). But the legislature then amended
the statute and specifically granted tax-exempt status to all non-profit licensed
homes for the aged, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.06(14) (1969). In Jasper v. Mease
Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968), the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the statute.
27 Fredericka Home for the Aged v. County of San Diego, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 221
P.2d 68 (1950); see also Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles, 188 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 10 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1961). In Fredericka all applicants for admis-
sion were required to pay an entry fee, but only 65% of the operating ex-
penses came from the fees from the inhabitants. In Fifield the charges were
less than the actual cost of operation.
28Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 195 Kan.
90, 402 P.2d 802 (1965) (some residents were admitted who could not pay
their share, and the income from residents did not exceed operating costs).
29 Bozeman Deaconess Foundation v. Ford, 151 Mont. 143, 439 P.2d 915 (1968)
(there was no actual profit and some residents were admitted who were un-
able to pay the full charge; the dissenters in Milwaukee Protestant Home for
the Aced excluded Bozeman from those homes which gave free services. 41
Wis. 2d at 302, 164 N.W.2d at 302).
3o In re Tax Appeals of United Presbyterian Homes, 428 Pa. 145, 236 A.2d 776(1968) (the home never realized a profit and was open to some not able
to pay).
31 Electra Arms Apartment and Medical Center Foundation, Inc. v. City of
Wilmington, 254 A.2d 244 (Del. 1969).
32 Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerreville Inc. School Dist., 426 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.
1968).
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Ohio,33 Illinois,3 4 Oregon, 35 Minnesota,36 Colorado,3 7 and Missouri 3s
have denied it. On an analogous issue, if not facts, a federal district
court recently took the more conservative approach,39 while at the
same time the Internal Revenue Service took the liberal position.40
Examination of the cases from the other states which have granted
the exemption indicates that Wisconsin has gone further than the
others, with the possible exceptions of Florida, where the exemption
was provided by legislative enactment, and Delaware, which seems
to allow a property tax exemption for all organizations not organized
for profit (in Wisconsin, all Chapter 181 corporations). In the Cali-
fornia, Kansas, Montana, and Pennsylvania cases the homes either took
some residents who did not pay their full share or their operation
showed no overall profit, or both, but Wisconsin has granted the
exemption where there is no element of almsgiving at all and the
revenues from the residents exceed the operating expenses.
If the Wisconsin legislature did not intend that all non-profit
homes for the aged meeting the requirements of Chapter 181 should
be exempt from property taxation, some additional guidelines will
have to be set forth to determine which homes are benevolent and
which are not. Further, if the legislature does feel the Milwaukee
Protestant Home for the Aged decision is too broad an interpretation,
there still remains the problem of whether it can effectively establish
definite guidelines requiring a more conservative approach. The job
will not be easy. JosEPE C. BRANCH
Constitutional Law-Judicial Intervention in Church Property
Disputes: Every year a number1 of church property disputes come
before the civil courts. These controversies arise from schisms, political
quarrels within churches, unions or mergers between churches, appoint-
ment of clergy, and expulsion of members. Although courts have tradi-
33 Philadelphia Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d 135, 214
N.E.2d 431 (1966); see also Crestview of Ohio, Inc. v. Donahue, 14 Ohio
St. 2d 121, 236 N.E.2d 668 (1968).
34 Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39, Ill. 2d 149, 233 N.E.2d 537 (1968).
35 Friendsview Manor v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Ore. 94, 420 P.2d 77 (1966),
aff'd on rehearing, 247 Ore. 94, 427 P.2d 417 (1967) ; Oregon Methodist Home
v. Horn, 226 Ore. 298, 360 P.2d 293 (1961).36 See Madonna Towers v. Commissioner of Taxation, 167 N.W.2d 712 (Minn.
1969), which quoted from Wisconsin's dissenting opinion.
37 United Presbyterian Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 448 P.2d 967 (Colo.
1968).
35 Defenders' Townhouse, Inc. v. Kansas City, 441 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1969).
39 Bank of Carthage v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 77 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (a federal
estate tax exemption was denied to a trust fund claimed to be for "charitable
purposes" when the fund was used to maintain a cemetery which provided
no free lots).
40 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969 INT. Ray. BULL. No. 1969-44, at 10, where the same
issue as in the nursing home cases is decided in favor of the tax exemption.
1 About 10 cases per year from federal courts and the highest state courts ap-
pear in the digests.
